Developments in Iran's ballistic missile program have made headlines over the last several years.
these attacks, with a senior military adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning that Iran would ªre its missiles against oil reªneries and other critical infrastructure in the event of a U.S. or Israeli strike. 6 At the same time, Iran's efforts to develop and test its ballistic missile arsenal have led states in the region to improve their defenses around critical infrastructure, including oil facilities, with U.S. assistance. 7 In a telling comment, a representative of Saudi Arabian King Abdullah told a senior U.S. ofªcial that he "worries more about an Iranian missile launch against Saudi oil facilities than a terrorist attack . . . because he can take preventive measures against terrorism but not against Iranian missiles." 8 A successful Iranian missile attack on Persian Gulf oil installations would have many of the same effects as a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
9 By disrupting oil production, a successful missile strike could reduce the supply of oil on the world market and cause a spike in oil prices. 10 Presumably, Iranian retaliation would be designed to impose substantial economic costs on an attacker. Bulletin, 2008 (Vienna: OPEC, 2008 Clawson and Eisenstadt, The Last Resort, pp. 16-18; and Angus McDowall, "Iran Threatens to Cut Off Gulf Oil Exports If Nuclear Facilities Are Attacked," Telegraph, June 28, 2008. that Saudi Arabia represents the most lucrative "target" if Iran (or, indeed, any state) is interested in reducing oil production to upset world energy markets.
Drawing from open sources, our analysis of Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure and Iran's missile capabilities ªnds that Iran could not signiªcantly reduce Saudi exports using its existing missile stockpile. Further, redundancies in Saudi infrastructure and limits on Iranian capabilities make some Saudi exports virtually impossible to disrupt. This does not mean that an Iranian missile campaign would be without cost: any missile campaign is almost certain to cause a large spike in oil prices. 17 Still, because we believe there would be no real damage to Saudi oil installations or disruption in oil production, governments could take steps, such as the release of strategic petroleum reserves, to calm energy markets. 18 In a military sense, the Iranian missile threat to Saudi Arabian-and, by extension, Persian Gulf-oil is overstated.
Our conclusion suggests that concerns surrounding Iran's capacity to retaliate for an attack on its nuclear program by launching missiles at Persian Gulf oil installations are militarily unfounded. Although Iran has other ways to penalize any nation that attacked its nuclear program, a missile campaign against oil infrastructure should not be a signiªcant concern for policymakers. Further, funds currently devoted to hardening the region's oil infrastructure and improving its missile defenses are unnecessary. If, however, regional actors remain concerned about the ballistic missile challenge, the funds devoted to missile defense would be better spent adding backup, or "redundant," facilities to Gulf oil networks to mitigate the consequences of an attack, rather than trying to stop damage from occurring. This conclusion would change only if Iran begins to develop longer-range missiles that more effectively employed Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance.
The remainder of this article proceeds in eight sections. The following section speciªes the working assumptions of our analysis. The next section provides a detailed description of Saudi Arabia's oil network and identiªes likely Iranian targets. We then discuss Iran's missile capabilities and Saudi Arabia's defensive assets. Subsequently, we analyze the requirements and effects of an Iranian ballistic missile campaign. Next, the article considers potential Saudi countermeasures and what our ªndings suggest for other forms of Iranian re-
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17. Oil and gas prices often move in response to perceived vulnerabilities in energy supplies. The economic effects of an attack may thus be out of proportion to actual supply disruptions. See Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, "The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices," pp. 1-4. taliation. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for U.S. and allied policy in the Persian Gulf and understanding military vulnerabilities in oil networks writ large.
Setting and Assumptions
We do not consider an unprovoked Iranian attack on Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure likely. Because an attack would likely invite a violent international response, it is implausible that Iran would target these installations except over vital national security issues. Given current security concerns, Iran's use of ballistic missiles against oil installations would most likely follow a U.S. or an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Some analysts might question whether Iran would invite further punishment by retaliating against its neighbors and a key U.S. interest. Nevertheless, American and Persian Gulf leaders believe that Iran poses a real threat. Likewise, even if the scenario seems unlikely, this analysis presents a worst-case scenario that allows us to explore more general claims about Iran's missile capabilities and Saudi Arabian vulnerabilities. To do so, we make several simplifying assumptions.
First, we assume that Iran's goal would be to disrupt global oil supplies in an effort to retaliate for an attack while depriving Saudi Arabia-whose support for efforts to curb the Iranian nuclear program are well documented-of its principal source of revenue. 19 In other words, the aim of the missile campaign would be to prevent Saudi oil from reaching world markets. We therefore assume that the Iranian attack would employ all of Iran's missile assets.
Second, we consider the maximum damage Iran could cause given Saudi Arabia's independent capability to defend its oil network. We therefore assume that the United States does not become involved in the conºict. This assumption helps establish the absolute magnitude of the Iranian threat to Persian Gulf oil. If Saudi Arabia can defend its oil installations using its own forces, then analysts can challenge the notion of an Iranian threat to regional security. Conversely, if Iran can effectively shut down the Saudi oil network, then there is greater justiªcation for efforts to improve Saudi Arabian defenses.
Third, we premise our analysis on a near-term clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia in which both sides ªght with the military capabilities already in their arsenals.
Fourth, we assume that Iran enjoys access to perfect information regarding the location of Saudi oil facilities. Even if perfect information is unavailable,
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Iran could likely obtain very good information using open source services (e.g., Google Earth) and intelligence collected by Iranian agents.
Fifth, we assume that all of Iran's missiles ªre and detonate as intended, without any "duds."
20 Although the fourth and ªfth assumptions are unlikely in practice, they maximize Iran's chance of success in accordance with the worst-case-scenario nature of this exercise.
Finally, we consider only an Iranian ballistic missile attack. In practice, Iran could conduct special operations, air, and naval attacks alongside a missile strike.
21 It might also divert assets to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf or to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. 22 We focus exclusively on a ballistic missile campaign for analytic clarity, though we discuss the implications of this analysis for other forms of attack later in the article.
Saudi Arabia's Oil Infrastructure and Its Vulnerabilities
Saudi Arabia has the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, with approximately 20 percent of the world total.
23 These reserves are distributed among eighty-ªve oil ªelds containing more than 1,000 producing wells, though most production comes from six to eight ªelds. 24 Saudi oil production is managed by Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil company. Crude oil production averaged approximately 9.2 mbd in 2008 out of a potential capacity of approximately 11.8 mbd.
25 This represents nearly 13 percent of oil produced September 4, 2008, p. 13 . Slightly lower total production ªgures are reported in EIA, "Country around the world daily. 26 Saudi Arabia is also the world's largest oil exporter with total exports of 8.4 mbd. 27 It is, however, a much more signiªcant player in crude oil markets, with 18.2 percent of world crude exports (7.3 mbd), than in reªned product markets (5.3 percent of world reªned exports with 1.1 mbd product exports).
28
Once pumped from ªelds, oil travels to processing facilities throughout Saudi Arabia via 15,000 kilometers (km) of pipelines and more than thirty pumping stations. These "downstream" facilities prepare the oil for domestic consumption or export.
29
There are several basic steps in this process. Freshly pumped oil consists of an unstable mixture of oil, water, gas, and sand that can damage industrial equipment; non-oil elements must be removed before the oil can be further processed. Oil is therefore pumped directly from the ªelds to one of sixty gasoil separation plants (GOSPs) where the elements are separated and the oil prepared for further processing.
30
After leaving a GOSP, the majority of Saudi oil moves to stabilization plants for further treatment. Except for the approximately 2.6 mbd capacity found in the Central Arabian, Safaniya, Shaybah, and Zuluf ªelds, all Saudi oil is considered "sour": that is, it contains signiªcant levels of hydrogen sulªde. Hydrogen sulªde makes sour oil dangerous to transport via tanker because it is poisonous in its gaseous form and highly corrosive. The sour oil must therefore be "sweetened" by removing the hydrogen sulªde before it can be shipped to world markets. 32 This process-referred to as "stabilization"-occurs at one of ªve facilities in Saudi Arabia. 33 Abqaiq is by far the most important of these facilities, as it processes two-thirds of all Saudi oil (6.1 mbd) and has a potential capacity of 13 mbd. 34 From a stabilization plant, crude oil is pumped either directly to a port for shipment abroad or to a reªnery for processing into commercial products (e.g., gasoline). In the latter case, crude oil is moved to one of seven reªneries. 36 After processing, the reªned product intended for export is pumped to Saudi ports for loading onto oil tankers.
31
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Saudi Arabia's ports can export more than 15.5 mbd of combined crude and reªned product. 37 Its three major oil ports are located at Ras Tanura and Ras alJuaymah on the Persian Gulf and Yanbu on the Red Sea. 38 Additional capacity is found at a series of smaller ports at Jeddah, Jizan, and Rabigh on the Red Sea, and Jubail, Ras al-Khafji, and Zuluf on the Persian Gulf.
39 As a rule of thumb, Ras Tanura and Juaymah handle approximately 75 percent (6.3 mbd) of all Saudi oil exports; most of the remaining 25 percent ships from Yanbu. does transporting oil to the Gulf ports. Because Ras Tanura is less than 100 kilometers downhill from Abqaiq, oil can likely ºow from Abqaiq to Ras Tanura largely by force of gravity. At least three pump stations line the route, but these may not be necessary for oil to reach the terminals. 41 When oil is moved uphill, however, pump stations are necessary to overcome the force of gravity.
42
Given that Yanbu and the other Red Sea facilities are more than 1,200 km to the east, mostly uphill, from Abqaiq, eleven pumping stations are used to move oil through the 1,400 km, 5 mbd "Petroline" connecting Abqaiq to the Red Sea oil ports.
43 Table 1 summarizes the preceding discussion of Saudi production and capacity.
We assume that an Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure would try to cause the maximum amount of damage with the least possible expenditure of force. To select targets, we hypothesize that Iran would consider the quantity of oil ºowing through each facility, redundancy of each facility (i.e., how readily a similar facility could replace its functions), size (i.e., concentration) of the target, and speed with which the targeted facility could be repaired. Some facilities are unlikely targets because they are dispersed or redundant. For example, Iran is unlikely to attack Saudi oil ªelds. To stop production at an oil ªeld, Iran would have to destroy the wells. This would require the destruction of many small targets spread over a large area; to halve production, for example, Iran would have to eliminate more than 500 wells spread across several thousand square miles.
44 GOSPs make poor targets for similar reasons: although not as numerous as wells, more than sixty such facilities are spread throughout the country. 45 Nor is Iran likely to target pipelines, given their small size and ease of repair. Not only are there more than 15,000 km of pipeline in the country, but Aramco has taken steps to minimize the effects of pipeline damage. First, cameras and monitoring systems help to identify damage and expedite repairs. Second, pipelines have shutoff valves to limit oil losses from a rupture. 46 Third, Aramco pre-positions replacement parts throughout the country and can reportedly repair damage to pipelines within thirty-six hours. 47 Finally, we do not believe that Iran would focus on Saudi Arabian oil reªneries. As noted above, Saudi Arabia's reªned products constitute a small percentage of Saudi exports and are comparatively less important as a percentage of global oil supplies compared with crude oil. Although we cannot totally discount an Iranian attack on Saudi reªneries, the disparity in crude and reªned production suggests that Iran's efforts would be best served elsewhere.
We conclude that Iran would target Saudi Arabian stabilization facilities. Five factors underlie this ªnding. First, destruction of the stabilization plantswith Abqaiq a particularly lucrative target-would prevent Saudi Arabia from transforming its sour crude into a product safe for export. Second, Saudi stabilization facilities have been targeted previously when a Saudi terrorist cell un- 2 ), the stabilization process occurs in towers concentrated in speciªc parts of each facility.
49 Fourth, each stabilization facility is within 300 km of Iran and thus within range of most Iranian missiles. 50 Finally, some of the stabilization towers were speciªcally designed for Saudi facilities, meaning they would take a signiªcant amount of time to replace.
51
As a next-best option, Iran might try to prevent oil from reaching the market by attacking the Saudi export system. Compared to the stabilization plants, the export system is a second-best option because of the small size of the targets and excess capacity. Nevertheless, we include the scenario because of the proximity of the Gulf ports to Iran. There is also a long history of warring states targeting oil export facilities. During World War II, for instance, the Allies targeted rail-lines and ports transporting Romanian oil to Germany.
52 Likewise, the Iran-Iraq War saw each country try to impede the other's oil exports by attacking export facilities. Iran, for instance, attacked Iraqi oil terminals off the Fao Peninsula, and the Iraqi air force launched a bombing campaign against Iran's Kharg Island terminal.
53
The primary target of such an attack would be the Gulf ports through which most Saudi oil is shipped. Attacking the Gulf ports alone, however, would still enable Saudi Arabia to export at least 5 mbd (59 percent of current exports) through its Red Sea facilities.
54 Therefore, an attack on the export system might also target the Red Sea ports and pump stations along the Petroline. Supplies, 1939 -1945 (London: William Kimber, 1985 Studies, 1990), chap. 7, pp. 5-7. 54 . Exports of 5 mbd assume that Saudi Arabia has no prepositioned oil stocks on the Red Sea coast and depends solely on the Petroline. If it has prepositioned stocks, then it could export substantially more, given that Yanbu alone has an export capacity of 6.5 mbd. 55. A 1991 study by Aramco engineers suggests that shutdown of the last pump station along the Petroline would eliminate up to 56 percent of Petroline throughput. Robert Baer asserts that de-In the scenario we describe, Iran would attempt to destroy Saudi oil installations using its existing ballistic missile arsenal. Over the past two decades, Iran has worked to improve its short-and intermediate-range ballistic missile (SRBM and IRBM) capabilities. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian missile assets expanded from a handful of Scud-B missiles purchased from North Korea (known locally as Shahab-1s) to a large collection of imported and domestically produced missiles. Speciªc information on the Iranian stockpile is scarce, but most Iranian missiles appear to be road-mobile; some are becoming increasingly accurate. 56 Utilizing technology from China, North Korea, and Syria, Iran's most advanced SRBMs may be able to obtain a 100-meter circular error probable (CEP) with a system employing inertial guidance-possibly with GPS updates-and limited terminal maneuvering.
57 By way of contrast, the Scud-B employed by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War had a CEP of more than 1,000 meters. 58 There is no evidence, however, that Iran has taken the technological leap to successfully integrate GPS into a terminally guided missile able to achieve accuracies on par with Western and other advanced systems.
59 Table 2 presents a summary of the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal, excluding programs under development, unconªrmed, or believed terminated.
60
A Crude Threat 179 struction of the ªrst pump station on the Petroline (Pump Station 1) would stop the ºow of oil to the Red Sea. Given the ambiguity of Baer's report, we follow the Aramco study in assuming that destruction of any one pump station would reduce rather than stop the ºow of oil. It is unclear whether these tests were successful. Nevertheless, they suggest that the Iranian military is considering how its missile arsenal factors into its concept of operations.
63
Whereas Iran's ballistic missile arsenal has become more sophisticated over time, Saudi Arabian ballistic missile defenses remain relatively limited. Saudi Arabia relies on the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) system with approximately 800 interceptors for ballistic missile defense. 64 Standard operating procedure dictates ªring two interceptors at each incoming missile, giving Saudi Arabia the ability to target the ªrst 400 missiles before the stockpile is exhausted. 65 Initial reports from the 1991 Gulf War suggested that PAC-2 achieved a 70 percent success rate against Iraqi missiles. Subsequent investigations, however, indicated that the rate was closer to 10 percent. 66 Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in purchasing the more advanced Patriot PAC-3 system, but the system has not yet been procured. 67 Overall, the weakness of Saudi missile defenses relative to Iranian missile assets suggests the potential attractiveness of a missile campaign to Iranian planners.
Iran's missile stockpile consists of a mix of older and newer designs. Shahab-1s and -2s, domestically produced versions of the Scud-B and Scud-C, are the most accurate missiles with sufªcient range to reach Abqaiq and the Petroline pump stations. 68 The analysis assumes that Iran would use the Shahab-1 against these facilities: although the Shahab-1 has a shorter range than the Shahab-2, its larger warhead and smaller CEP would maximize Iran's chance of success. 69 Estimates of the size of the Shahab-1 arsenal vary. Our analysis gives Iran the maximum 400 Shahab-1s in accordance with our worstcase assumption. 70 Although we do not address the Shahab-2 explicitly, the analysis illustrates the limited effect of 450 additional Shahab-type missiles.
We further assume that Iran would use the more accurate Fateh A-110 against Saudi Arabia's Persian Gulf oil terminals and stabilization facilities within the missile's 210 km range. 71 We do not know the size of the Fateh stockpile, although a recent report suggests that the total may be as small as 10. 72 Given, however, the extensive testing of Iranian short-range missiles in recent years, and reports that Iran is producing a successor Fateh, our analysis assumes a worst case in which Iran has been producing the Fatehs in larger numbers. Based on Iranian production rates for the Shahab-2, Iran may have up to 150 Fateh missiles at its disposal. Iran had a maximum of 450 Shahab-2s at its disposal in 2007, 200 of which were reportedly purchased from North Korea in the early 1990s. 73 The remaining missiles were reportedly produced domestically after 1997. 74 Since the Fateh A-110 reportedly entered production in 2004 and is-like the Shahab-2-an SRBM, similar procurement rates would give Iran approximately 150 Fateh A-110s in 2010.
Describing the Attack: Iranian Requirements
This section analyzes the effects of a hypothetical Iranian attack against Saudi stabilization facilities. Next, it considers the results of an alternative, though militarily more demanding, attack against Saudi Arabian ports. Finally, it examines the sensitivity of our ªndings by illustrating how the results change with different assumptions regarding Iranian capabilities and Saudi vulnerabilities. scenario 1: attacking the stabilization facilities As noted earlier, Abqaiq is the most important stabilization facility in Saudi Arabia. The heart of the facility consists of eighteen stabilization towers. 75 Ten of the towers are clustered in the northern part of Abqaiq, with the remainder in the southern half of the facility. that the northern towers fall in a 300 by 20-meter row while the eight southern towers are in a less linear conªguration. 77 The towers themselves have a diameter of less than 6 meters. Less is known about the composition of Saudi Arabia's other stabilization facilities at Jubail, Ras al-Juaymah, Ras Tanura, and Qatif. Using Google Earth, we believe that the only structures within Ras Tanura matching the Abqaiq towers are within a 20 by 30-meter area. 78 We were unable to identify stabilization towers at Qatif, Jubail, and Ras al-Juaymah; given the similar capacities of the smaller facilities, we use the measurements of the Ras Tanura towers as a proxy. As discussed above, elimination of all the stabilization facilities would reduce Saudi exports to 2.6 mbd of naturally sweet oil.
We assume that a missile striking near the towers could produce sufªcient overpressure to destroy the towers and their associated machinery. We estimate that it would take 15 pounds per square inch (psi) of peak overpressure to rupture the stabilization towers.
79 Using reference TNT blast curves and scaling to a 985-kilogram (kg) warhead, the Shahab-1 can produce 15 psi overpressure out to a distance of 30 meters. 80 Therefore, a missile falling within this lethal radius of a given tower would cause the tower's destruction.
To determine the requirements to destroy Abqaiq's northern towers, we treat each tower as an aimpoint and send the missiles in salvos of ten (one missile at each aimpoint). 81 Because the towers are close together and the weapons not perfectly accurate, a missile aimed at one tower could inadvertently de-
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77. Saudi Aramco, "Abqaiq Plants"; and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, "GAS-ABQ4" in "Photo Gallery: Page 2," 2006, http://www.mopm.gov.sa/ mopm/detail.do?contentϭphoto_gallery2; and Google Earth (accessed 2008-10) . Towers are visible on Google Earth at 25°55'58.00" N, 49°40'59.77" E; 25°55'43.35" N, 49°41'16.95" E. 78. See Google Earth (accessed 2008-10) at 26°41'43.10" N, 50°05'36.32" E. 79 . There is no publicly available information on overpressure requirements for stabilization towers. As a proxy, we used the 15 pounds per square inch (psi) of peak overpressure required to destroy petroleum fractionating towers. See Whitney Raas and Austin Long, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), p. 20 n. 48. 80 . The known relationship between overpressure and distance from impact can be scaled to larger warheads using R L ϭ D x W 1/3 , where R L is the lethal radius of the warhead, W is the size of the warhead in kilograms, and D is the lethal radius for a 1 kg TNT warhead (for 15 psi, approximately 3 meters). Thus, R L ϭ 3 x 985 (1/3) , or 29.8 meters. TNT blast curves taken from U.S. Navy, "Damage Prediction," in "Introduction to Naval Weapons Engineering," Federation of American Scientists, n.d., http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/es310/dam_crit/dam_crit.htm. There is no available information on the actual explosive used in the Shahab warhead. We assume that it is TNT, recognizing that alternate warheads would produce 15 psi out to a greater distance; fewer missiles would then be required. 81. Following John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional CruiseMissile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999) , pp. 77-78. The results are not signiªcantly different if aimpoints are placed on every other tower. stroy a different one. We thus use a Monte Carlo simulation to produce a random landing point for each of the ten missiles according to a circular normal distribution. 82 We then determine whether the random landing point was within the lethal radius of any tower for each iteration of the simulation. If a missile lands within the lethal radius of a tower's center, we consider the tower destroyed.
83
In calculating missile requirements, we assume that Iran wants to be at least 75 percent conªdent that its attack would destroy any given aimpoint. 84 The equations for these calculations appear in note 85. 85 The results of the simulation show that Iran would need to launch a minimum of 660 Shahab-1 missiles to target the ten northern towers even without Patriot attrition. Applied to the southern towers, the same approach shows that the remaining eight towers require at least 672 additional missiles. Iran would thus need more than 1,300 missiles to target Abqaiq's towers with 75 percent conªdence of destroying any one tower. Including 10 percent Patriot attrition against the ªrst 400 missiles raises the total for Abqaiq to 1,376 Shahab-1s. This does not mean there is a 75 percent chance all Abqaiq towers will be destroyed by 1,376 missiles. Rather, given that the probability of destroying each aimpoint is 75 percent, the likelihood that an attack would destroy all eighteen towers equals 0.75
International Security 36:1 186
82. CEP is used to determine the standard deviation of the circular normal distribution around the aimpoint: CEP/1.1774. We assume that the range and deºection errors are similar, so that
See George M. Siouris, Missile Guidance and Control Systems (New York: Springer, 2004), pp. 311-313. 83 . Because a missile could land within the lethal radius of two towers, both towers are consid- is the probability that a missile misses tower 1, and P n is the probability that tower 1 is hit by a missile intended for tower n in the 10,000 iterations of the simulation. The average likelihood that any given tower is destroyed in a given salvo, P hit , is the average value of P miss n across all ten towers. The number of missiles required to target these towers, N, is thus given by the formula:
to the eighteenth, or less than 1 percent. If Iran wanted greater conªdence that its attack would destroy all of the towers, it would need to launch more missiles.
86
Applying the same approach to the other stabilization facilities and substituting Fateh A-110 speciªcations (500 kg warhead, 100 m CEP) shows that each facility requires 40 missiles with 10 percent Patriot attrition; destroying all 4 requires at least 160 missiles. Figure 1 summarizes the missile requirements.
87
These missile requirements are much lower than for Abqaiq because of the smaller size of the targets and the Fateh's greater accuracy.
scenario 2: attacking the export system Iran might attack Saudi Arabia's export system as an alternative to targeting the stabilization facilities. We assume that to stop exports through the Persian Gulf ports, Iran would have to destroy the machinery and pipes associated with each tanker berth.
88 These berths come in various sizes and shapes. Table 3 summarizes each target's size and distance from Iran. Because the Gulf ports are close to Iranian territory, we assume that they could be targeted with the Fateh A-110.
Port facilities are signiªcantly more dispersed than the stabilization facilities and surrounded by water. Given that a water impact would prevent warhead overpressure from destroying the loading platforms, we assume that Iran's missiles would have to directly impact an oil loading point to ensure destruction. 89 Our calculations treat a port target as destroyed if one missile hits the platform. Missile requirements, calculated using the equations listed in note 90, for port facilities number in the thousands and are shown in table 4.
90
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86. For example, Iran would need to launch 3,130 missiles for 50 percent overall success against all 18 towers. 87. The equation is N needed ϭ 0.9(N launched ), where N needed is the number of missiles required to destroy a target with 75 percent conªdence and N launched is the number of missiles that must be launched to overcome Patriot attrition; 0.9 is the proportion of missiles that will reach a target with 10 percent attrition. 88. Because the pipelines feeding offshore terminals are underwater, Iran would have a limited ability to destroy them using ballistic missiles. We thus focus on the destruction of the berths. 89. U.S. Air Force targeting ofªcer, personal communication with authors; and U.S. Navy, "Damage Prediction." This accords with the Iraqi experience at Kharg Island, where only direct hits successfully damaged the wharf. See Cordesman and Wagner, "Phase Four: Stalemate and War of Attrition on Land," pp. 5-9, 19-21. 90 . The probability of a direct hit on each rectangular platform with length L and width W is given by
For circular targets with radius r, the probability of a hit is Having targeted the Persian Gulf ports, Iran might next attack either the Red Sea ports or Petroline pump stations to prevent Saudi Arabia from diverting 5 mbd to the Red Sea terminals. In the former case, only Iran's longest-range missiles could reach the oil berths at the main Red Sea port of Yanbu. 91 We estimate the missile requirements using the warhead size and CEP of the Shahab-3A.
92 Calculations for the destruction of Yanbu's berths are included in Iran could reduce exports via the Red Sea with a successful attack on Saudi Arabia's Petroline pump stations. An attack on Pump Station 1 is the most plausible scenario, because it falls within range of Shahab-1 and -2 missiles. Although the dimensions of Pump Station 1 are unknown, the locations of Pump Stations 3, 6, 9, and 10 are in the public record. 93 To identify the critical components of the pump stations, we looked for common features in images of the known stations. Doing so revealed a common set of ªve buildings covering an area of approximately 180 by 30 meters. Destroying these targets would require 660 Shahab-1s with Patriot attrition against the ªrst 400 missiles. In context, this means that it would take 660 additional missiles to simply reduce the ºow of oil to the Red Sea, in addition to the more than 6,000 Fateh missiles required to destroy the Persian Gulf ports.
sensitivity analysis
This section considers how variations in our assessment of Iranian capabilities and Saudi facilities affect our calculations of Iranian missile requirements. We analyze the implications of these variations in the following section.
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93. Although we cannot ªnd its precise location, Pump Station 1 is reportedly close to Abqaiq. As the Petroline ºows from Abqaiq to Yanbu, we hypothesize that it is located nearly adjacent to the Abqaiq facility. Baer, "The Fall of the House of Saud," p. 54. The locations to Pump Stations 3, 6, 9, and 10 are known because they have airªelds, the coordinates of which have been reported to the International Civil Aviation Consortium and posted to GlobalSecurity.org. "Saudi Airªelds," GlobalSecurity.org, April 27, 2005, http First, the calculations are sensitive to changes in Iranian missile accuracy (see ªgure 2). Improving Shahab-1 CEP by 25 percent, which might be achieved with integrated GPS-inertial guidance in a Scud-type system, results in a nearly 40 percent decrease in missile requirements. 94 Along the same lines, a hypothetical Fateh with sufªcient range to reach Abqaiq would reduce missile requirements for its destruction by 90 percent compared to the baseline Shahab-1 (ªgure 2). This holds despite the Fateh's smaller warhead. Thus, the situation facing Saudi Arabia could change dramatically if Iran embarks on a missile accuracy improvement program.
Relatedly, the calculations are sensitive to changes in the degree to which facilities are hardened against attack. For example, if stabilization towers cannot be destroyed by overpressure and instead require a direct hit, then the number of missiles required for the destruction of Abqaiq with Shahab-1s rises from 1,332 to more than 1 million with no Patriot attrition. Conversely, if the towers can be destroyed with only 10 psi overpressure, then the lethal radius for the Shahab-1 warhead grows to 37.8 meters, and missile requirements for Abqaiq fall from 1,332 to 824.
Effects of an Iranian Attack
The effect of an Iranian attack on the Saudi oil network would depend on the number and characteristics of available missiles. With current assumptions, more than 1,300 Shahab-type missiles would be needed to target Abqaiq's towers. With the 400 missiles on hand, Iran would be unlikely to do signiªcant damage. Increasing the desired probability of success raises missile requirements: for example, a 50 percent overall probability of destroying Abqaiq's towers would require more than 3,300 missiles. Moreover, even if Abqaiq was destroyed, Saudi Arabia would still be able to produce and stabilize 5.6 mbd of oil. 95 Therefore, even if Iran has many times the number of missiles we estimate, a signiªcant portion of Saudi Arabian oil is secure.
That said, 150 Fateh missiles appear to be sufªcient for Iran to destroy the smaller stabilization facilities. 96 Their destruction would remove an estimated 3.0 mbd stabilization capacity. Because, however, Abqaiq uses only 6.1 of its 13 mbd processing capacity, the destruction of these smaller facilities would not affect total output. This ªnding holds even if Abqaiq's capacity is signiªcantly less than estimated. Although we believe that Abqaiq's actual capacity is much greater, Aramco only reports its capacity as "more than" 7 mbd.
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Using 7 mbd as a lower bound, we calculate that Abqaiq's spare capacity could compensate for nearly all 1.25 mbd actually processed by the smaller stabilization facilities. The remainder could be replaced by additional production from Zuluf and Safaniyah. In short, 150 Fateh missiles would be insufªcient to disrupt Saudi production even with conservative estimates of Saudi capacity.
Similarly, missile demands are such that an Iranian port attack would be unlikely to reduce Saudi Arabian exports. If Iran has 150 Fateh missiles, it could best employ them by targeting Ras Tanura's Sea Islands, as these facilities handle the port's largest tankers. Given, however, excess berthing capacity at the Red Sea and other Persian Gulf ports, a successful attack would have a miniInternational Security 36 :1 192 95. This amount is based on the 2.6 mbd productive capacity of naturally "sweet" oil and the 3.0 mbd stabilization capacity outside of Abqaiq. 96. Assuming no Patriot interception, Iran requires 144 Fatehs. To eliminate Patriot cover, Iran could ªre Shahab-type missiles or artillery rockets to "soak up" Saudi interceptors before launching Fatehs. 97. Saudi Aramco, "Abqaiq Plants." mal effect on exports. 98 Overall, a Fateh attack on the Persian Gulf ports could reduce some of Saudi Arabia's excess export capacity without degrading actual exports.
Instead, hundreds of additional missiles would be needed for Iran to decrease actual exports. Even if the smaller Persian Gulf ports were rendered inoperable by other means, Iran would need to launch a minimum of 240 missiles at the Ras Tanura wharf in addition to those launched at the Sea Islands. Alongside a successful strike on the Sea Islands, destruction of the wharf would eliminate Ras Tanura's 6 mbd export capacity and leave Saudi Arabian exports dependent on Ras Juaymah (3 mbd) and the 5 mbd Petroline. 99 In this extreme case, Saudi Arabia could still maintain 8 mbd of exports, only 0.4 mbd below 2008 levels.
Of course, even if the Iranians were unable to fully destroy the Gulf ports, a missile attack could lead Saudi Arabia to divert a portion of its exports to the Red Sea ports. In either case, additional costs would accrue as oil was diverted to the Red Sea and countries normally serviced from the Gulf encountered longer transportation times.
What would happen, however, if Iran targeted all 400 Shahab-1s at a portion of Abqaiq? That is, what would be the maximum damage that the Shahab-1 stockpile could cause? Damage would be minimal, because 400 missiles are sufªcient to destroy only one tower with a 60 percent chance of success. If the tower were destroyed, Abqaiq's total capacity would drop from 13 to 12.3 mbd. 100 Because, however, Abqaiq runs below half capacity, its destruction would have no long-term impact on Saudi Arabia's ability to stabilize oil. The facility could still handle its 6.1 mbd throughput with capacity to spare.
Although we do not believe that Iran has sufªcient missiles to take Abqaiq offline, it is not impossible that Iran will eventually have the capability to do so. Abqaiq's destruction would have a signiªcant effect on Saudi exports given that stabilization is a necessary step for the safe transport of most Saudi oil by tanker. Taking into account increased production from naturally sweet sources and assuming the other stabilization facilities could run at full capacity, ap-would be sufªcient to offset the losses from the destruction of Abqaiq for more than six months, given 2008 consumption rates. If all 1.4 billion barrels in government reserves were employed, the repair window would be nearly ªfteen months.
